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Abstract
Secure group communication allows a set of nodes (or
devices) to communicate securely amongst each other over
unprotected and open networks. Provision of security for
group communication is based on cryptographic services,
which relies on careful management of cryptographic key-
ing material. Securing group communication in wired net-
works is fairly well understood, however wireless networks
introduce further challenges as group members may move
from one place to another while still remaining in a group
session. In this paper we propose a host mobility proto-
col to govern group member movement in wireless mobile
environments. We introduce the use of lists as part of our
protocol design in order to facilitate host mobility.
1. Introduction
The advance in Internet technology, in particular multi-
cast functionality [8] (which efficiently enables group com-
munication), has increased the demand and popularity of
group-based applications such as multimedia conferencing,
news or stock updates and virtual classrooms.
Both end-users and content (or service) providers have
similar security expectations for multicast applications as
in traditional point-to-point (unicast) applications. Thus a
vital component of any security architecture for group com-
munication is the design of a group key management frame-
work (GKMF), within which to govern the management
keying material.
Previous GKMF proposals, such as those in
[1][2][5][7][10][11][13][14][19][22][24] were not de-
signed with wireless mobile environments explicitly in
mind. While some efforts have been made to extend
GKMFs to mobile environments, such as [4][6][8][20][21],
most do not explicitly address host mobility issues.
Providing mechanisms to address this specific problem
is fundamental if secure group communication is to be
deployed in wireless mobile environments. In this paper
we propose and analyse a host mobility protocol.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
describes the main components of a GKMF. Section 3 iden-
tifies specific issues that need to be addressed in a GKMF
for wireless mobile environments. In the following two sec-
tions we present our proposal for supporting host mobility.
Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2. Group Key Management Frameworks
A GKMF is an infrastructure comprising the basic en-
tities and functions necessary to provide common crypto-
graphic keys to all communicating entities (group members)
in a network supporting group (multicast) communication.
The main objectives for group communications are similar
to traditional unicast communications, namely the provision
of confidentiality, integrity and authentication security ser-
vices. A GKMF provides all the management tasks to main-
tain and protect the keys required to implement all of these
services.
The main components of a GKMF can be divided into
two parts, each of which is discussed in the following sub-
sections.
2.1. GKMF architecture
The GKMF architecture specifies:
• the main entities within the GKMF, which typically
consist of key managers, group managers and group
members;
• the placement of these entities within the architecture;
• the trust relationships between the entities;
• the (types of) cryptographic key used within the archi-
tecture.
2.2. Key management processes
The essential processes identified within a GKMF for se-
cure group communication are as follows:
• Formation of multicast group. This includes group cre-
ation and initial registration of group members. Group
creation can consists of a host sending a request to the
network via the Internet Group Management Protocol
(IGMP)[7][23]. Registration of group members is typ-
ically performed by a host sending a join request to
a group manager (perhaps asking for a specific inter-
net service). At this point all the information related
to a group, such as group membership policy and the
required cryptographic keys, is determined.
• Generation and distribution of cryptographic keys.
Cryptographic keys can be symmetric, asymmetric or
a combination of both, depending on the security ob-
jectives or preferences of particular applications. Most
GKMFs employ symmetric keys because symmetric
algorithms have lower computational complexity and
are faster than asymmetric algorithms [9][15]. Typical
key types are:
– Individual keys. Also referred to as long-term
keys, these keys are unique to every host (po-
tential group member) and are typically gener-
ated by, and shared with, a key or group manager.
These keys are established prior to the group cre-
ation.
– Group keys. Also referred to as traffic encryption
keys (TEKs), group keys are generated by a key
manager, and shared by all group members of a
multicast group. Primarily used for securing the
actual data communication, group keys are usu-
ally distributed to every member of a multicast
group under the protection of individual keys.
An auxiliary key may be needed for the secure and ef-
ficient distribution of a group key to the group mem-
bers [11][17][24]. Instead of having to send the group
key separately under the protection of individual keys
of group members, it can be sent once via a multicast
message protected under the auxiliary key.
Where asymmetric cryptography is used, all entities
involved in the group communication are assigned
asymmetric key pairs [1][11][12].
• New member joins. Similarly to initial registration, any
host who wishes to join a group will need to send a join
request message to a governing entity such as a group
manager. If the member is granted permission to join
the group then relevant keys need to be delivered to the
newly joined member.
Provision of backward secrecy [11][19] may require
re-keying of cryptographic keys whenever a new mem-
ber joins a group in order to control access to the pre-
vious group traffic from the new member. Re-keying
will result in all group members including the newly
joined member obtaining a new group key.
• Existing member leaves. This process is initiated by
sending a leave request message to a governing entity
such as a group manager. If provision of forward se-
crecy [11][19] is required then re-keying will need to
occur in order to update the group with a new set of
group keys, and to control access of future group traf-
fic from the leaving member.
Unlike member joins, member leaves can be voluntary
or non-voluntary. While the former occurs at the re-
quest of a group member, the latter can occur acci-
dently (such as when a member is disconnected), or
when a member is evicted from a group. An eviction
of a group member usually requires re-keying to occur.
• Re-keying. This may occur due to group membership
change (new joins for backward secrecy, and member
leaves for forward secrecy), re-keying may also occur
due to:
– Periodic re-keying. A pre-determined plan to
re-key a multicast group after a certain interval
(which is often dictated by a group policy, as well
as security requirements of a particular applica-
tion).
– Expiration of cryptographic keys. When a key
has reached the end of its validity period.
– Compromised keys. When a key used is believed
(or suspected) to have been compromised and is
no longer considered safe to use.
Re-keying events are normally initiated by governing
entities such as group or key managers.
3. GKMFs for Wireless Mobile Environments
(WMobEs)
The GKMF components identified in the previous sec-
tion are generic to any networking environment. Wire-
less mobile environments have several special characteris-
tics that need to be taken into account when designing a
suitable GKMF. The two most important are identified in
the following subsections. These have been incorporated
into a generic GKMF model for wireless mobile environ-
ments [18].
3.1. New reasons for joins and leaves
As well as the reasons discussed in Section 2.2, group
members may join and leave groups as they move between
areas, while still remaining in a group session. The pro-
cess of a member moving to another area can be treated as a
leave from one area followed by a join to another. Moving
members member will need to notify a key manager, prior
to moving. Such a move may require the provision of back-
ward and/or forward secrecy (since different areas may have
their own security requirements). Thus a specific protocol
is required to govern host mobility.
3.2. Additional key management to support
mobility
The generation of new keying material may be required
in order to support host mobility. For example:
• Moving members may still hold cryptographic keys of
the areas they visited even after they leave a group,
which may lead to compromise.
• Host mobility may require group members to occa-
sionally communicate via a foreign network (the vis-
iting area) that may not be fully trusted. Thus, it is im-
portant to ensure that group members that are moving
from one area to another are protected (via different
sets of keys).
• Group members that move between areas may gather
the area’s local security information. It is imperative to
ensure that the area is protected from members who are
moving from one area to another in order to collect the
security information (keys) of each area for malicious
purposes.
4. A GKMF Supporting Host Mobility
In the next two section we propose a method of sup-
porting host mobility gor group communication in wireless
mobile environments. In this section we briefly outline the
GKMF and in the next section we provide details of the host
mobility protocol.
4.1. Scope of proposal
It is important to note the following:
• Infrastructure-based environment. The framework for
the proposed protocol relies on an infrastructure based
environment with a basic underlying cellular architec-
ture [3][16][20] as its networking platform.
• Key distributions and key updates. The aspects of key
management that the protocol is primarily concerned
with are key distribution and key updates (or, re-keying)
which may occur during host mobility. Other aspects
of key management such as generation, registration as
well as deletion of keys are implicitly assumed to be
available.
• Simplified protocol descriptions. Our protocol descrip-
tions will be simplified in order to highlight how the
keys in the GKMF are utilized to provide confidential-
ity services. Provision of other security services (such
as data integrity and message authentication) are im-
plicitly assumed.
4.2. Main architecture
We adopt the general cellular architecture based on the
notion of domain(s) and areas as the basic framework
[11][18]. The reason for adopting logically or physically
defined domains and areas is to provide a means to have an
administratively manageable environment for group com-
munication to take place within.
• Main entities. The main entities involved are:
– Domain key manager (DKM): responsible for
generating, distributing, storing and deleting all
keying materials that may be required at the do-
main level, as well as playing the role of group
controller, which includes managing group poli-
cies, group membership, re-keying events and se-
curity policies.
– Area key manager (AKM): one per area, operat-
ing under the DKM’s jurisdiction and responsible
for key management within the area, including
for group members residing within that area.
– Group member(s): senders and receivers, defined
to reside within one area at any given time.
• Placement of entities. Figure 1 shows placement of
entities in domain i and area j, with DKM as the main
key manager of domain i and AKM as the key manager
of the area j.
Figure 2 shows placement of group membersM across
a domain j, where distribution of members occurs
throughout the areas a to e. The arrows denote the
movement of group members between the areas.
• Trust relationships. We assume that all key managers
(DKMs and AKMs) are trustworthy and reliable. All
Figure 1. Placement of entities in domain i
and area j.
Figure 2. Placement of group members
throughout areas.
group members trust these key managers. There are
two levels of trust relationships:
– At the domain level. All AKMs trust the DKM as
the primary key distributor, as well as the main
group manager for various groups operating in
that domain.
– At the area level. All group members (residing
in that area) trust their AKM as the main ref-
erence point for security parameters needed for
group communication.
• Types of key. The symmetric keys used are:
– Domain-Area Key, DAi−Key. A unique long-
term key shared between the DKM and AKMi
of area i. Generated by the DKM, the function
of each Domain-Area key is restricted to unicast
communication between the DKM and a particu-
lar AKM.
– Area-Member Key, AiM−Key. A unique key
shared between AKMi and group member M .
Generated by the AKM, the function of each
Area-Member key is restricted to unicast com-
munication between AKM and the group mem-
ber.
– Area Key, A−Key. A group key unique to an
area. Generated by each AKM, the main purpose
of having an area key is for managing host mo-
bility and for efficient and scalable re-keying.
4.3. Host mobility protocol functionality
Since a moving member may accumulate information for
each area it visits, provision of backward secrecy is neces-
sary for controlling access to an area’s past security infor-
mation (which could be used for malicious purposes). This
requires re-keying to occur whenever host mobility occurs.
Thus the main functional requirements of our host mobility
protocol are to:
• transfer a group member from one area to another area;
• initiate a re-keying of an area key of a visiting area;
• deliver a new area key of a visited area to a moving
member and to group members residing in that area.
The main security requirements of the protocol are to:
• ensure that only transfers from authorized group mem-
bers are processed;
• secure communications between the group member
and the area key manager;
• secure communications between the area key manager
and the domain key manager;
• protect the distribution of area key of the visited area
to the moving member.
4.4. List(s) management
In this section, we introduce an important concept that
we will use as part of our protocol design. As group mem-
bers may frequently move between a number of areas while
still remaining in a group session, every time a member
moves, re-keying of an area key may need to occur.
As frequent re-keying may cause disruption of group
communication, it may be necessary to keep track of the
mobility of a highly dynamic group member. This can be
useful to avoid frequent re-keying of an area key. To facili-
tate this, we propose the use of a list referred to as a mobility
list (MobList). This is securely maintained by key managers
(DKM and AKMs) in a domain and contains information
on group members that move from one area to another (and
also indicates how many area keys the member possesses).
Each time a member moves from one area to the next, the
following information is logged in MobList:
• ID of the moving member,
• ID of the multicast group joined by the member,
• ID of the area that a member is moving from,
• ID of the visited area that a member is moving to.
MobList can be used to keep track of host mobility and
frequent re-keying can be avoided every time a member
moves back into an area that it recently visited. This is be-
cause when the same member moves back into that area, the
AKM of the visited area can determine (by looking up its
MobList) whether the member is a returning member who
is just moving back into the area, in which case re-keying
of the area’s key may not need to take place.
5. Host Mobility Protocol
We now specify our host mobility protocol.
5.1. Notation
We use the following notation:
• DKM. Domain key manager.
• IDD. Identity (ID) of DKM.
• AKM. Area key manager.
• AKMi. AKM of area i.
• IDAi . ID of AKMi.
• Mi. Group member of an area i.
• IDMi . ID of Mi.
• IDG. ID of a multicast group G.
• DAi−Key. Domain-Area key between DKM and
AKMi.
• AiMi−Key. Area-Member key between AKMi and
Mi.
• A−Keyi. Area key of area i.
• A−Keyinew. New area key of area i.
• Sm−Keyji. Session mobility key between AKMi and
Mj .
• ||. Concatenation operator.
• {m}k. Encryption of message (or data) m with a sym-
metric algorithm using the key k.
• text. A field in the message content which may contain
optional information.
• a→ b. Unicast transmission from entity a to entity b.
• Mov−TokenD. A move token from DKM → AKM
containing security parameters associated with a mul-
ticast group during host mobility.
• Mov−TokenA. A move token from AKM →M con-
taining security parameters associated with a multicast
group during host mobility.
5.2. Important assumptions
For ease of design, we make the following assumptions:
• Availability of secure encryption algorithms.
• Implicit use of secure entity and data origin authenti-
cation mechanisms such as use of message authentica-
tion codes (MACs).
• Symmetric keys specified in Section 4.2 are assumed
to have been established securely prior to the com-
mencement of the host mobility protocol.
• Use of some form of time variant parameter such as
a time stamp in the text field within protocol messages
for freshness checking.
• The membership of all key managers (DKM and
AKMs) in a domain is predetermined and fixed. Thus,
each Domain-Area key and the Domain key are static
and valid until the policy determines otherwise.
• Availability of secure storage of cryptographic keys for
all group communication entities.
• Availability of secure mechanisms for managing the
MobList.
5.3. The protocol
This protocol describes transfer of a group member from
one area to another with consideration to secure access to
previous keys and group data traffic (backward secrecy).
The protocol also includes the delivery of a new area key
A−Keyvnew to the moving member, as well as to the group
members residing in that area.
Throughout this protocol, we make the following as-
sumptions:
• An established multicast group has already been cre-
ated.
• Moving member Mi (currently in area i) and AKMv
(in the visited area v) have securely established a
shared short-term session mobility key Sm−Keyiv
prior to moving.
The message flow of this protocol is depicted in Figure 3.
The steps involved are described as follows:
Figure 3. Member Moving with Backward Se-
crecy protocol message flow.
1. A group member Mi that wishes to move into another
area sends a move−notify message along with the ID
of the area that he is moving into (IDAv ) to:
(a) its current area key manager AKMi protected un-
der Area-Member key AiMi−Key:
Mi → AKMi : IDMi‖{IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖
IDMi‖text}AiMi−Key.
(b) the area key manager of the visited area
AKMv protected under a session mobility key
Sm−Keyiv:
Mi → AKMv : IDMi‖{IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖
IDMi‖text}Sm−Keyiv.
2. Upon receiving the move−notify message from Mi,
AKMi checks the message by decrypting it with
AiMi−Key and passes the message to DKM pro-
tected under Domain-Area key DAi−Key:
AKMi → DKM : IDAi‖{IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖
IDMi‖text}DAi−Key.
3. Upon receiving the message from AKMi, DKM
checks the message by decrypting it with DAi−Key,
and sends the move−notify message to AKMv along
with the ID of Mi in the form of Mov−Token, where
Mov−TokenD = {IDG‖IDAi‖IDMi‖IDAv‖text}
protected under the Domain-Area key DAv−Key it
shares with AKMv:
DKM → AKMv : IDD‖{Mov−TokenD‖
text}DAv−Key.
4. Upon receiving the move−notify message from
DKM and Mi, AKMv does the following:
(a) checks the message from DKM by decrypting it
with the Domain-Area key DAv−Key it shares
with the DKM;
(b) checks the message from Mi by decrypting it
with the session mobility key Sm−Keyiv it
shares with Mi;
(c) assuming that the checking is valid, AKMv looks
up its MobListv and if Mi is not in the list (mean-
ing that this is Mi’s first time to enter the area),
AKMv must re-key its area key A−Keyv . To do
so, AKMv generates a new area key and sends it
via the ready−to−rekey message. This results
in all group members MAv in that particular area
obtaining the new area key A−Keyvnew.
(d) AKMv sends the new area key A−Keyvnew
via a move−welcome message in the form
of Mov−Token, where Mov−TokenA =
{IDG‖IDAi‖IDMi‖IDAv‖A−Keyvnew‖text},
to :
• Mi, protected under the session key
Sm−Keyiv;
• DKM, protected under the Domain-Area
key DAv−Key.
(e) If Mi is already on MobListv , AKMv will need
to check whether there has been any re-keying of
its area key since Mi’s last visit to the area. If
none, AKMv sends a move−welcome message
to Mi in the form of Mov−Token, along with
its current area key A−Keyv (as in Step 4(d)).
Otherwise, AKMv sends an updated area key
A−Keyvnew to Mi.
5. Upon receiving the move−welcome message from
AKMv , DKM informs AKMi of the successful move
of member Mi via a move−welcome message, pro-
tected under a Domain-Area key.
Note that re-keying of the area key due to host mobility
only needs to occur within the visited area (which the
member is moving to) and does not affect other areas.
Having the new information concerning member Mi,
DKM and AKMs (AKMi and AKMv) will need to update
their MobList in order to keep track of member Mi’s mobil-
ity, along with the number of area keys that may have been
kept by Mi.
In cases where provision of backward secrecy is not nec-
essary, no update of keying material will need to occur dur-
ing host mobility, and a moving member is given the same
key(s) currently in use in the visited area.
5.4. Analysis of protocol
In this section, we provide a basic analysis of the pro-
posed protocol.
• A member Mi who wishes to move into another area
must first establish a short-term session mobility key
with the AKM of the visited area, and we have as-
sumed that this was done securely (see Section 5.3).
• After obtaining the session mobility key, Mi initiates
the move protocol by sending a move−notify mes-
sage to its local area key manager AKMi, protected
under the Area-Member key, and to the visited area
key manager AKMv , protected under the session mo-
bility key. If an adversary gets hold of the enciphered
messages between the entities, he has no way of deci-
phering the message as he has no access to either of
the keys (Area-Member key or session mobility key).
• A member Mi uses the session mobility key to se-
cure communications with the AKMv . If an adversary
wants to masquerade as some moving member in order
to get hold of the area key of the visited area, he will
not be able to do so because he has no access to the
session mobility key shared only between the moving
member and the AKMv .
• We have implicitly assumed the provision of data ori-
gin authentication (such as using MACs). Thus, we
can conclude that if an adversary wants to masquer-
ade as some moving member in order to get hold of
A−Keyv or A−Keyvnew, the adversary will not able
to do so because he has no access to the MAC key.
Other entities (DKM, AKM and Mi) can easily check
the integrity of messages received via the same pro-
cess.
• After receiving the move−notify message from
AKMi, DKM notifies AKMv of the move, protected
under the Domain-Area key. Similarly, if an adversary
gets hold of the enciphered message between DKM
and AKMv , he has no way of deciphering the message
as he has no access to the Domain-Area key.
• After receiving the move−notify message from
DKM andMi (and ifMi is not in the MobList), AKMv
initiates the re-keying of its area key A−Keyv . This
results in all members residing in the visited area, in-
cluding the moving member Mi, obtaining the new
area key A−Keyvnew. AKMv can send this key to
group members (excluding Mi) in the area either via
multicast, protected under the old area key A−Keyv ,
or via unicast, protected under the Area-Member keys.
AKMv sends A−Keyvnew to Mi, protected under the
session mobility key. If an adversary wants to get hold
of A−Keyvnew, he will not be able to do so because
he has no access to the keys (A−Keyv , Area-Member
keys, or session mobility key).
• We have implicitly assumed the provision of data ori-
gin authentication, so we can conclude that if an ad-
versary wants to masquerade as some moving member
in order to get hold of A−Keyvnew, the adversary will
not be able to do so as he has no access to the MAC
keys.
• On a member’s first move into an area, the area needs
to be re-keyed with a new area key, and information
about the moving member is logged in MobList. If it
is necessary to control the number of area keys that
are kept by a group member (which corresponds to the
number of areas that he visited), MobList may need
to be reset for that particular member after a period
of time, for example when the number of area keys
collected by a member (as he moves from one area to
another) has reached a threshold limit. In this case,
re-keying of the area key may need to occur when the
member moves into an area. This will be determined
by the group security policy at the creation of a multi-
cast group, prior to the commencement of group com-
munication. This is useful to avoid a group member
moving from one area to another with intent to collect
all the area keys. If colluding members want to ex-
change security information, such as area keys, to gain
unauthorized access to different areas, this could also
be prevented (periodically).
• All affected key managers (DKM, AKMi and AKMv)
update their MobList, and area(s) visited are logged.
We assume that these lists are maintained and kept se-
curely by the key managers.
6. Conclusion
We have proposed a protocol for facilitating member
moves with consideration for backward secrecy. Using the
protocol, a group member Mi moves from an area man-
aged by an area key manager AKMi (where it is currently
residing), to another area managed by AKMv , while still re-
maining in the group session. The move is managed by the
DKM via AKMi. For provision of backward secrecy, when
a member moves to a visited area, the area key of visited
area needs to be re-keyed. This results in group members
(including the moving member) residing in that particular
area obtaining a new area key. All affected key managers
during host mobility (such as DKM, AKMi and AKMv)
need to update their MobList, and new information regard-
ing the moving member is logged into the lists.
The proposed protocol features a mechanism (MobList)
that allows for efficient processing of members who are re-
turning to recently visited areas during host mobility.
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